COMMENTS
Judicial Response to Governmental Loss
or Destruction of Evidence
The defendant in a criminal case learns that shortly after the crime
occurred, government agents arrived at the scene and removed all
pieces of evidence. The defendant moves to discover some evidence,
which he contends is highly material to his defense. The government
agency admits having taken possession of the evidence sought, but explains that it has since been lost or destroyed.
Many commentators on criminal procedure1 have recognized the
2
problem of defining the scope of discovery of evidence by the defense.
1 Vast amounts have been written on criminal discovery in general, including Brennan,
The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279;
Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DuKE L.J.
477; Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. Rxv. 293 (1960);
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own
Statements in the Federal Courts, 57 COLUM. L. Rav. 1113 (1957); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALF. L. REv. 56 (1961); Lonisell, The Theory
of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. RFv. 921 (1961);
Miller, The Omnibus Hearing-An Experiment in Federal Criminal Discovery, 5 SAN
DiEo L. Rav. 293 (1968); Moran, Federal Criminal Rules Changes: Aid or Illusion for
Indigent Defendant, 51 A.B.A.J. 64 (1965); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 228 (1964); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAav.
L. R-v. 940 (1961); Comment, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair
and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REv. 127 (1962); Comment, Protective Orders as a Safeguard in Broadened Criminal Discovery, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1295 (1965); Comment,
Toward Effective Criminal Discovery: A Proposed Revision of Federal Rule 16, 15 VILL.
L. REv. 655 (1970).
2 The statutory basis of criminal discovery is rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). Rule 16 allows pretrial discovery
by the defense of (1) any relevant written or recorded statements or confessions made by
the defendant, results of examinations and tests, and recorded testimony of the defendant
before a grand jury; (2) books, papers, documents, tangible objects, and buildings or places,
upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the defense and reasonableness. As
sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders, the court may "order [the] party to

permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances." The Jencks Act
allows discovery by the defense of statements and reports of government witnesses after
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Two connected and equally important problems, however, have not,
as yet, been fully explored: when should sanctions be applied where
there is a loss or destruction of admittedly discoverable evidence by
a government agent prior to a trial, and, if a sanction is appropriate,
what sanction may the court apply?
In dealing with the loss or destruction of evidence, courts have relied on cases from two general areas: those dealing with the suppression of evidence and those dealing with the destruction of interim
notes. (Interim notes are notes made by a government agent that are
later incorporated into a final report.)3 This comment, after reviewing
the reasoning and sanctions utilized in these two types of cases, will
analyze their application to the destruction-of-evidence situation.
Finally, a new approach suggested by a recent case, United States v.
Bryant,4 will be explored.
I.

SOURCES OF JUDICIAL ANALYSIS AND AUTHORITY

A. Suppression-of-Evidence Cases
Along with the duty to comply with pretrial discovery orders,5 the
prosecution has the related duty to disclose to the accused information that would be helpful in preparing 7 or presenting his defense. 9
the witnesses have testified on direct examination in the trial of the case. If the government fails to comply with a Jencks Act order, "the court shall strike from the record the
testimony of the witness . . . unless the court . . . shall determine that the interests of
justice require that a mistrial be declared."
3 In these cases, the term "interim notes" is not the courts'. It is used in this comment
to distinguish between notes incorporated into a formal report before being destroyed
(interim notes) and notes destroyed without incorporation (which are treated as "destruction-of-evidence" cases).
4 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
5 See note 2 supra.
6 See generally Cannon, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 516 (1969);
Ginsburg, Disclosure to the Defense in a Criminal Case, 57 ILL. B.J. 194 (1968); Note, The
Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 CoLuM. L. REV. 858 (1960);
Comment, Disclosure and Discovery in Criminal Cases: Where Are We Headed?, 6 DuQUESNE L. REv. 41 (1967); Note, Discovery and Disclosure-DualAspects of the Prosecutor's
Role in CriminalProcedure, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 92 (1965); Note, The Prosecutor'sDuty
to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 425 (1966); Comment, Criminal Discovery Implications of the False Evidence and Suppression of Evidence Cases, 34 TENN.
L. Rav. 654 (1967); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the
Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
7 Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80, 85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 US. 931 (1963). The
prosecutor has a duty to disclose evidence that would be significant to the defendants "in
planning and conducting their defense." See Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty
to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, supranote 6, at 145-46.
8 E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (evidence showing that confederate and
not defendant had done the actual killing); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
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The duty to disclose extends to any evidence in the possession of the
government 0 that would be material" to the defense.
In the leading case in this area, Brady v. Maryland, 2 the Supreme
Court indicated that the withholding or suppression of material evidence by the government is a violation of due process. In Brady, a
murder case, the prosecution withheld from the defense a statement
made by the defendant's confederate in which the confederate admitted
that he had done the actual killing. At the trial, the accused conceded
that he had participated in the crime, but pleaded against capital
punishment on the ground that he had not done the actual killing.
Since the statement of the confederate would have aided the defense
in mitigating the punishment, the Court held the suppression of the
statement to be a violation of due process.' 3
The aim of the Court in Brady was to secure a fair trial for the defendant rather than to punish the government for its misconduct.' 4 The
(evidence going to the credibility of a key government witness); Barbee v. Warden, Md.
Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (reports of ballistics and fingerprint tests made
by police department that would have tended to exculpate the defendant).
9 Both courts and commentators have noted the large disparity in resources between
the government and the defendant in gathering evidence. E.g., Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d
1209, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1967): "The Government's facilities for discovering evidence are
usually far superior to the defendant's. This imbalance is a weakness in our adversary
system which increases the possibility of erroneous convictions." Jackson v. Wainwright,
390 F.2d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1968); Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1182-83, notes: "Even [the defendant's] search for evidence at large is inevitably restricted because he has neither a crime laboratory nor vast
identification and fingerprint files available to him. Most often, he has no investigative
assistance whatever." See 8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL. PACrICE
16.02[l] (2d ed. 1970); Traynor,
supra note 1,at 229; Note, Discovery and Disclosure-Dual Aspects of the Prosecutor's
Role in CriminalProcedure,supra note 6, at 105; Note, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence, supra note 6, at 428-29; Comment, Criminal Discovery Implications
of the False Evidence and Suppression of Evidence Cases, supra note 6, at 663; Note, The
Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, supra note 6, at
142-43.
10 The duty to disclose has been held to apply to the police and other government
officials as well as the prosecution. In Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842,
846 (4th Cir. 1964), the court stated that "it makes no difference if the withholding is by
officials other than the prosecutor. The police are also part of the prosecution, and the
taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the State's Attorney, were guilty of the
nondisciosure." The court added, id., that "[t]he duty to disclose is that of the state,
which ordinarily acts through the prosecuting attorney; but if he too is the victim of
police suppression of the material information, the state's failure is not on that account
excused." See Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir. 1958); Imbler v. Craven,
298 F. Supp. 795, 806 (C.D. Cal. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, supra note 6, at 428.
11 For a discussion of what constitutes "material" evidence, see text and notes at notes
23-34 infra.
12 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
13 Id. at 86.
14 Some sanctions in the area of criminal procedure are imposed to punish the police
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imposition of sanctions where material evidence has been suppressed,
according to the Court, "is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of a prosecutor but the avoidance of an unfair trial to an accused."'15 The unfairness of the trial was held to derive from the
materiality of the evidence suppressed and not from the motivation
behind the suppression:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 16
State and lower federal courts have followed this approach, ignoring
the circumstances surrounding the nondisclosure17 and the good or
bad faith of the prosecution.' 8 Where the information withheld would
have been helpful to the defense, its suppression is recognized as
rather than to separate the guilty from the innocent. A clear example of this is the exclusion of coerced confessions. See generally Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346-47 (1957).
15 373 U.S. at 87.
10 Id. Although the Court mentioned a request by the defense for the information
sought, it does not appear that the element of request is decisive, at least not where the
evidence in question is highly material to the defense. In Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,
102 (1967), Justice Fortas, concurring, stated: "I see no reason to make the result turn on
the adventitious circumstance of a request. If the defendant does not know of the existence
of the evidence, it may not be able to request its production." Cases in which the court
granted relief without a request by the defense include Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 831 F.2d 842, 845 (4th Cir. 1964) (evidence withheld tending to exculpate defendant);
United States ex rel. Meets v. Wilkins, 826 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1964) (evidence withheld
tending to exculpate defendant); and State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 564, 422 P.2d 125, 128
(1967) (evidence withheld would have aided defense of self-defense); see Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1966); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 532, 487 P.2d
1234, 1289, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 599 (1971); Hanson v. Cupp, 484 P.2d 847, 849 (Ore. App.
1971); 8 J. MooRE, supra note 9,
16.06[l]; Cannon, supra note 6, at 517; Comment,
Criminal Discovery Implications of the False Evidence and Suppression of Evidence Cases,
supra note 6, at 662-63.
17 See United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961). The
fact that the suppression is the result of nondisclosure by the police rather than the
prosecutor has been held to be irrelevant. See authorities cited note 10 supra.
18 In Jackson v. Wainwright, 890 F.2d 288, 295 (5th Cir. 1968), the court stated: "In
accord with Brady lower federal courts have emphasized the harm to the defendant rather
than the prosecutor's motive in failing to disclose exculpatory evidence." United States v.
Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209, 1211 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Barbee v. Warden, Md.
Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326
F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563,
571 (2d Cir. 1961); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 532, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238, 96 Cal. Rptr.
594, 598 (1971); State v. Vigliano, 50 N.J. 51, 60-61, 232 A.2d 129, 134 (1967); Hanson v.
Cupp, 484 P.2d 847, 850 (Ore. App. 1971); Means v. State, 429 S.W.2d 490, 494 (rex. Crim.
App. 1968); see Note, Discovery and Disclosure-DualAspects of the Prosecutor'sRole in
Criminal Procedure, supra note 6, at 102; Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to
Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, supra note 6, at 141-42.
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equally harmful regardless whether the nondisclosure resulted from
innocence, negligence, or guile.
Before the court will impose sanctions for the suppression of evidence, however, the defense' must demonstrate that the nondisclosure
resulted in prejudicial error.2° Courts regard the nondisclosure of
information to be harmless error where the defense fails to show the
materiality of the evidence sought 2' or where the defense counsel was
22
independently aware of and had access to the evidence.
The scope of "materiality" has not yet been delineated by the Supreme Court. In Giles v. Maryland,23 in which the prosecution had
withheld information concerning the prosecutrix's promiscuity and
mental instability from the defense in a rape case, the Supreme Court
remanded the case for further consideration. The Court expressly left
open the question "whether the prosecution's constitutional duty to
disclose extends to all evidence admissible and useful to the defense,
and the degree of prejudice which must be shown to make necessary
19 The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the materiality of the evidence
sought. See note 21 infra.
20 Where the prosecution acts in bad faith, some courts have maintained that it is
not necessary for the defense to show prejudice to be entitled to relief. If the suppression
was the result of negligence or accident, however, the defendant must show that the nondisclosure prejudiced his defense. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 146-47 (2d Cir.
1968); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209, 1210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Barbee v. Warden, Md.
Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 847 (4th Cir. 1964); Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 858 U.S. 937 (1964); United States v. Consolidated Laundries
Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1961); see Note, Discovery and Disclosure-Dual
Aspects of the Prosecutor'sRole in Criminal Procedure,supra note 6, at 103.
21 In Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967), Justice Fortas, concurring, stated the
general attitude of the courts:
This is not to say that convictions ought to be reversed on the ground that information merely repetitious, cumulative, or embellishing of facts otherwise known to the
defense or presented to the court, or without importance to the defense for purposes
of the preparation of the case or for trial was not disclosed to defense counsel. It is
not to say that the state has an obligation to communicate preliminary, challenged,
or speculative information.
Where the information withheld is found to lack materiality, the conviction will be
affirmed. E.g., United States v. Keogh, 440 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, - S. Ct.
-;
United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 488 F.2d 174 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); United States v. Crisona, 416 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 897 U.S. 961 (1970); Luna v. Beto, 395 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 966 (1969); United States v. Tomaiolo, 378 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
889 U.S. 886 (1967); In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 887 P.2d 6, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1968),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 908 (1964); Means v. State, 429 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968);
see Note, Discovery and Disclosure-Dual Aspects of the Prosecutor's Role in Criminal
Procedure,supra note 6, at 103.
22 E.g., Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 871 (1958); Thomas v. United States,
343 F.2d 49, 54 (9th Cir. 1965); see United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763,
767 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955); Means v. State, 429 S.W.2d 490, 495 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1968).
23 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
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a new trial. '24 State and lower fedeiai courts have defined "materiality"
broadly and in varying ways. 25 It has been defined as "evidence which
...might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about [the
defendant's] guilt,"2 6 "information impinging on a vital area in [the]
defense," 27 information "vital to the defense of the accused," 28 "evidence that may reasonably be considered admissible and useful to the
defense, ' 29 and "pertinent facts relating to [the] defense."8 0 Evidence
pertaining to the credibility of a key government witness has also been
held to be material. 31 Although the admissibility of the information
as evidence will be considered in determining its materiality to the
defense,3 2 a number of courts have stated that the mere inadmissibility
of the information sought does not automatically render it immaterial.3 3 Courts have also noted that in cases of doubt, the usefulness
of the evidence is to be determined by the defense and not by the
34
prosecution.
at 74.
25 In Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967), Justice Fortas, concurring, noted that the
state is compelled to disclose any information "which is material, generously conceived,
to the case, including all possible defenses." See Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209, 1212 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Note, Discovery and Disclosure-Dual Aspects of the Prosecutor's Role in
Criminal Procedure, supra note 6, at 103; Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to
Disclose Evidence to the Defendant, supra note 6, at 148-49.
26 Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (evidence relating to credibility
of government witness).
27 United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622, 627 (3d Cir. 1963) (statement
given by defendant to police relevant for impeachment of key government witness).
28 United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 765 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 875 (1955). Dye involved an arresting officer's statement to the prosecutor that
the defendant had been under the influence of liquor at the time of the arrest. The defendant admitted the killing, but argued that he lacked the necessary mental intent for
first degree murder due to his drunken state. The prosecutor called as a witness another
police officer, who testified that the defendant was not drunk at the time of the arrest.
29 Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (information that an open
pen knife was found in murder victim's pocket where defendant pleaded self-defense).
80 Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1958) (information relating to credibility of government witness).
31 E.g., United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969); Levin v. Katzenbach,
363 F.2d 287, 291-92 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291
F.2d 563, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1961); Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 712 (3d Cir. 1958); In re
Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 533-34, 487 P.2d 1234, 1240-41, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 599-600 (1971);
cf. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 136 N.E.2d
853, 854-55, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1956).
32 Comment, Criminal Discovery Implications of the False Evidence and Suppression
of Evidence Cases, supra note 6, at 666.
33 See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring); United States
v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Comment, Criminal Discovery Implications of the False Evidence and Suppression of Evidence Cases, supra note 6, at 665-66;
Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, supra
note 6, at 147.
34 In Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950), the court stated the
24 Id.
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Although the burden of demonstrating the materiality of the evidence is on the defense, this burden is relatively light due to the
broad interpretation given to materiality by the courts. Moreover, the
evidence withheld is typically still in existence at the time the suppression is discovered8 5 and is, therefore, easily analyzable by the court.
Where the court finds that the suppression has resulted in prejudicial error, the sanction imposed is generally a new trial.86 In this
way, the defendant is able to prepare and present a defense with
access to all material information.87 The government, on the other
hand, is not required to let a guilty man go free.
B. Destruction-of-Interim-Notes Cases
In the cases involving the destruction of interim notes, the factual
situation is basically the same. Typically, a government agent has recorded data pertaining to the case or has taken notes while interviewing a witness who later testifies at the trial.38 These notes are incorporated into a formal report. The agent then deliberately destroys the
original notes and gives the defense a copy of the final report. The
defense moves for discovery of the original notes. 39 For the purposes
general attitude: "When there is substantial room for doubt, the prosecution is not to
decide for the court what is admissible ox for the defense what is useful." E.g., United
States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 570 (2d Cir. 1961); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Disclose Evidence to the Defendant, supra note 6, at 148.
85 This may be merely a matter of definitions. The courts may be labeling as "suppression" only those cases in which the evidence is in existence at the time the nondisclosure is discovered and as "destruction" those cases in which it is not. In all of the
cases cited in the preceding notes on suppression, the evidence was in existence.
36 E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825
(2d Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968); Levin v. Clark, 408
F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir.
1963); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961); United
States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955);
Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Smith v. Urban, 245 Ark. 781, 434
S.W.2d 283 (1968); State v. Vigliano, 50 N.J. 51, 232 A.2d 129 (1967); Hanson v. Cupp, 484
P.2d 847 (Ore. App. 1971).
37 This assumes, of course, that the evidence is in existence. See note 35 supra.
38 The vast majority of these cases involve notes from an interview with a government
witness. E.g., Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961), rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 979
(1962); United States v. Lepiscopo, 429 F.2d 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 948
(1970); United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969);
United States v. Baker, 358 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966); United
States v. Lonardo, 350 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Spatuzza, 331 F.2d 214
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 829 (1964); Ogden v. United States, 323 F.2d 818 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964); United States v. Tomaiolo, 317 F.2d 324 (2d Cir.
1963); United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 820 (1962);
United States v. Thomas, 282 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1960). Where the notes represent substantially verbatim statements, they are within the purview of the Jencks Act. See note 2
supra.
39 The defense may move for discovery under rule 16 or the Jencks Act. See note 2
supra.
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of this comment, only those cases will be considered in which the court
either holds or assumes that the original notes, if they were in existence, would be discoverable.
The leading case in this area is Killian v. United States,40 in which
interim notes from an interview with a government witness were destroyed after allegedly being fully incorporated into a final report. The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for a hearing to
determine whether the destruction of the interim notes had violated
due process or the defendant's rights under the Jencks Act.41 The
district court was instructed to make findings on three matters: (1)
whether the notes were made for the purpose of transferring data,
(2) whether the agent acted in good faith in destroying the notes, and
(3) whether the agent acted in accordance with the normal procedure
of the governmental unit in destroying the notes.
If the agents' notes of [the government witness's] oral reports of
expenses were made only for the purpose of transferring the data
thereon to the receipts signed by [the government witness], and
if, after having served that purpose, they were destroyed by the
agents in good faith and in accord with their normal practice, it
would be clear that their destruction did not constitute an impermissible destruction of evidence nor deprive [the defendant]
42
of any right.
If, on the other hand, the district court were to find any of the above
43
elements lacking, the defendant would be entitled to a new trial.
The Supreme Court expressly stated that the harmless error doctrine
was applicable to this type of case." Not all destructions of evidence
are per se violations of due process or discovery rights. 45 There must
be a showing of actual harm to the defendant before a new trial will
46
be granted.
Lower federal courts have uniformly followed the Killian approach
where there has been a destruction of interim notes. 47 The burden of
40 368 U.S. 231 (1961).
41 See note 2 supra.
42

368 U.S. at 242.

43

Id.

at 244. If the defendant were able to show bad faith on the part of the agent,

this would apparently be suffident to warrant a new trial even if he could not show conclusively that the original notes differed from the final report. Proof of bad faith without
proof of variance in the reports, however, would be difficult, if not impossible, to produce
since variance would be the major external evidence of bad faith.
44 Id. at 243-44.
45 Id. at 242.
46 Id. at 243-44.
47 E.g., United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849
(1970); United States v. Lepiscopo, 429 F.2d 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.. 948
(1970); United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969);
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showing lack of full incorporation of the notes into the final report is
generally placed on the defense. In the absence of such a showing by
the accused, courts typically find that the notes were fully transcribed
and that, therefore, material evidence was not withheld from the defense. The good faith of the government agent and the observance of
normal procedures are regularly stressed. Since evidence of the agent's
motives can come only from the agent himself, courts, for the most
part, appear to accept without question the agent's statement that he
acted in good faith. Similarly, courts generally do not explore the type
or efficiency of the evidence preservation rules followed by the government agency involved,48 but rather accept the agency's statement that
the destruction of interim notes is "normal procedure." 49 In the vast
majority of the interim notes cases, courts have, upon a finding of full
incorporation, good faith, and observance of normal practices, affirmed
convictions.50
United States v. Baker, 358 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966); United
States v. Comulada, 340 F.2d 449 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 978 (1965); Alexander v.
United States, 336 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 935 (1964); United States v.
Spatuzza, 331 F.2d 214 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 829 (1964); Ogden v. United States,
323 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964); United States v. Tomaiolo,
317 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 820 (1962); United States v. Thomas, 282 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1960); United States
v. Hilbrich, 232 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. I1. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 941 (1965).
48 The Fourth Circuit has, however, at least twice warned in dicta (in each case the
destroyed notes were held to be not within the purview of the Jencks Act) that it was
not satisfied with the agency's explanation that the destruction was in accord with "normal
procedure." In United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180, 201-02 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd on other
grounds, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), the court stated:
This is not the first time thai a court has been called upon to consider the effect of
the destruction of FBI interview notes. [Citations.] Each time the problem has arisen
the FBI has claimed that the notes were destroyed as part of FBI routine. This is
really not a satisfactory answer. Where the agent testifies to a matter he claims not
to be in the notes and the defendant insists on a different version, an issue arises
which may not be satisfactorily resolved in the absence of the original notes. If the
notes were available, they might confirm or refute one version or the other ...
Eliminating the uncertainty may serve the interest of the Government no less than
the defendant.
And in United States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293, 1304 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
913 (1970), the court noted: "[We do agree that the FBI's practice is subject to criticism
and introduces opportunity for the assertion of doubt. Retention of the notes would foreclose many attempts to impeach FBI agents' reports."
49 Conceivably, the defendant could introduce independent evidence on the failure of
the agent to follow the agency's "normal procedures," but not necessarily on the efficiency
of the procedures followed. No case has been found in which the defense introduced evidence on either matter.
50 A number of courts have expressed the view that the police cannot be forced to
retain all possible evidence. The basic notion was stated by Justice Frankfurter, concurring
in Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 102 (1961): "Nothing in the legislative history of

1972]

Loss or Destruction of Evidence

The emphasis in Killian and by lower federal courts on the good
faith of the agent and the observance of normal procedures in the
interim notes cases appears to be in sharp contrast to the total irrelevancy of these aspects in the suppression cases. Although courts in the
interim notes cases talk in terms of good faith and normal procedures,
however, it may be that the decisive factor in these cases-as in the
suppression cases-is the materiality of the evidence of which the defendant has been deprived. On the one hand, the defendant in an
interim notes case typically does not point to any particular information
left out of the final report. On the other hand, since the notes have
been destroyed, the court cannot be absolutely certain, as it can in a
suppression case, in which the evidence sought is still in existence,
that the error is harmless. The notes may well have contained additional information that would have been helpful to the defense, but
that the defense does not know of and cannot show because of the
destruction. Faced with this tension between the defendant's failure
to show a particular harm and the government's inability to demonstrate conclusively that there was full incorporation, the courts may
be using the agent's good faith and observance of normal practices as
resolving factors. 51 Were the defendant able to show a lack of full
incorporation, the reference to good faith and the circumstances of the
loss would be unnecessary-the probability of a deprivation of material information would be much less remote.
The view that the materiality of the evidence destroyed is actually
the decisive factor is supported by United States v. Lonardo.52 In
Lonardo, a stenographer had taken down verbatim the statements of
the witnesses as they were interviewed by the government agent. At the
trial, the stenographer testified that the final report prepared by the
agent omitted some statements included in the original notes. The
interim notes had been destroyed by the agent shortly before the trial
the [Jencks] Act remotely suggests that Congress' intent was to require the Government,
with penalizing consequences, to preserve all records and notes taken during the countless
interviews that are connected with criminal investigation by the various branches of the
Government."
5i The Supreme Court has not yet specified the extent to which the good or bad faith
of the agent in destroying the notes will be determinative of the application of sanctions.
In Campbell v. United States, 865 US. 85 (1961), after the Court remanded the case to the

district court for further hearings to determine whether the interim and final notes were
within the purview of the Jencks Act, the Court noted, but did not answer this question.
Id. at 98. And in Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963), the Court, although holding that the final report was within the scope of the Jencks Act, expressly declined to
reach the question whether the destruction of the interim notes, if done in good faith,
was sanctionable. Id. at 491 n.5.
52 350 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1965).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:542

commenced. The court found the failure to incorporate fully the
original notes into the formal report sufficient in itself to warrant
reversal.5 3 The court deemed it unnecessary to consider the good or
bad faith of the agent 4 or the observance of normal procedures55
where the defense had been deprived of significant information:
In the case before us we see no need to characterize the destruction
of these statements as in good faith or bad-as honest or corrupt.
These were no long lost documents or clerical filing errors. The
destruction was deliberate; it was on the eve of the trial; it was
accomplished by the government agent in charge of preparing
evidence for the prosecution of the case. The fact that the agent
who destroyed them may have done so in reliance upon FBI
regulations (or in good faith belief that such existed) does not
alter the nature of the sanctions imposed by the statute. 56
57
Where interim notes are destroyed without full incorporation,
the appropriate sanction is a new trial. 58 Where the notes pertained to
an interview with a government witness, the testimony of that witness
will be excluded at the trial.59 If the witness in question is central to
the prosecution's case, the exclusion of this testimony may lead the
prosecution to dismiss the case. 60
II.

DESTRUCTION-OF-EVIDENCE CASES

A defendant moves for discovery of certain evidence and is told that
it has been lost or destroyed by a government agency. The defendant
53 Id. at 527-28. Killian was expressly distinguished by the court in Lonardo on this
ground. Id. See also Lee v. United States, 368 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1966); text and notes at
notes 66-68 infra.
54 The dissent in Lonardo notes, 350 F.2d at 532: "No error of judgment or good faith
belief in the propriety of destroying such a statement by any government employee will
permit escape from the sanctions of the Jencks Act, unless 'the very same information'
has somehow been preserved in another form."
55 The dissent gives a detailed description of the routine followed by the agent in destroying the notes and his stated reasons for so doing. Id. at 535-36.
56 Id. at 529.
57 Under the language of Killian, a showing of bad faith or failure to observe normal
procedures on the part of the agent would be sufficient to warrant a new trial. Demonstrating bad faith without showing failure to incorporate, however, would be extremely
difficult. See note 43 supra. And it may well be that the incorporation or lack thereof is
the actual focal point of these cases. See text and note at note 51 supra.
58 Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 244 (1961); United States v. Lonardo, 350 F.2d
523, 529 (6th Cir. 1965).
59 The Jencks Act provides as sanction the striking of the witness's testimony or declaring a mistrial. See note 2 supra.
60 The court in Lonardo recognized, 850 F.2d at 529, that the exclusion of the witness's
testimony might "frustrate this prosecution." The dissent similarly noted, id. at 532, that
"[i]n the case at bar, application of this rule may well be tantamount to dismissal because
the government must rely upon the witnesses... to sustain its case."
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contends that without this evidence, he cannot possibly present an
adequate defense; his right to a fair trial has been violated by the
actions of the government agency. The prosecution argues that since
the evidence no longer exists, its potential usefulness for the defense
can never be definitely ascertained. It is unfair to society to let the
defendant go free solely because of the loss or destruction of one piece
of evidence of unascertainable value. Faced with this situation, the
court must decide whether sanctions are appropriate and, if so, which
sanction is proper for this particular case.
The type of evidence sought varies in the destruction cases. It may
be needed as part of the affirmative defense or for impeaching a government witness. If it is part of the affirmative defense, the evidence
may have directly proven the defendant's innocence or it may have
only supported his general version of the occurrence. Similarly, the
conduct of the government agent may vary; he may have acted from
good faith, negligence, or guile.
A.

Cases Adapting the Suppression Approach

In Trimble v. State6 1 the court applied the analysis developed in
the suppression cases to the problem of loss or destruction of evidence
by the government.6 2 In Trimble, a minister had been convicted of
the first-degree murder of the chairman of the Board of Stewards of
the church. The prosecution had charged that the killing had resulted
from an argument between the defendant and the deceased over certain debts owed by the defendant. The defendant minister claimed
that he had killed in self-defense when the deceased had attempted
to strike him with a table during an argument concerning improper
advances made by the deceased to the defendant's wife. The evidence
in question was a copy of a letter written by the minister to his superior allegedly concerning the improper advances and a tape recording that, according to the defendant, contained a conversation between
the deceased and the-defendant's wife in which the deceased made
indecent suggestions. By the time of the trial, the letter was lost and
the tape erased by the police.
The court in Trimble, as did the courts in the suppression cases,
placed its major emphasis on the potential materiality and usefulness
of the missing evidence and not on the motives of the government
agent or the circumstances of the loss and destruction: "The presence
and existence of the letter and tape recording in order to prove or
61 75 N.M. 183, 402 P.2d 162 (1965).

62 The court in Trimble recognized, however, id. at 186, that the destruction of evidence was "not strictly a suppression of evidence in the sense that the term is generally
used."
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substantiate defendant's version of the reason for the argument between decedent and himself and to support his claim of self-defense
would seem to be too apparent for argument." 63 At the same time, the
court recognized that if the recording had been preserved and did not
contain the alleged conversation, the prosecution's version of the incident would have been supported. 64 The court concluded, however,
that the potential materiality of the destroyed evidence was sufficient
to warrant a reversal and specifically noted that the lack of bad faith
on the part of the government agent was irrelevant: "The state . . .
argues that since the 'suppression' was negligent and not wilful, a different rule applies. That this is not true under the facts here present
would seem to be clear in what was said in Brady v. State of Maryland .... "65
Disregard of the good faith of the government agent is seen again in
Lee v. United States.6 6 In Lee, certain reports within the scope of the
Jencks Act had been destroyed without being incorporated into other
reports. These reports were relevant to the testimony of two government witnesses, who stated that they could not remember the precise
scope of the dealings in question without consulting the reports. The
court reversed the conviction on the ground that under these circumstances, the trial court should have struck the testimony of the government witnesses, regardless of their good faith in destroying the reports:
"Neither is there any reason to think that the destruction of the reports occurred in bad faith or otherwise than in an ordinary course of
business devoid of any conscious purpose to hamper the defense. But
the Jencks Act does not embody in terms any 'good faith' exception
....
67 The interim notes cases were expressly distinguished on the
68
ground that there was no incorporation of notes in the present case.
The sanctions imposed by courts applying the suppression approach
in the destruction-of-evidence situation have varied with the nature of
the evidence lost or destroyed. Where the 'evidence represented an
affirmative portion of the defense, as in Trimble, courts have held that
the case must be dismissed. 69 Where, however, it would have had value
63

Id. at 190.

64 Id. at 187.

65 Id. at 189.
66 368 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
67 Id. at 837.
68 Id. at 838 n.7.
69 Trimble v. State, 75 N.M. 183, 190-91, 402 P.2d 162, 168 (1965). See also United States
v. Heath, 147 F. Supp. 877 (D. Hawaii 1957), appeal dismissed, 260 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1958),
which was expressly followed by the court in Trimble. In Heath, a tax evasion case in
which certain of the defendant's records necessary for his defense were lost by government
agents, the court held that the indictment would be dismissed. Heath was based not on
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only in impeaching a government witness, the court may, as in Lee,
order a new trial in which the testimony of the government witness
will be excluded.
B.

Cases Adapting the Interim Notes Approach
Some courts, in dealing with the problem of loss or destruction of
evidence, have used an approach similar" to that employed in the interim notes cases. These courts have emphasized the conduct of the
government agent and the circumstances of the loss more than the use71
fulness of the evidence to the defense.
The leading case employing this approach is United States v. Augenblick,72 which involved a collateral attack on a court-martial conviction
through an action for back pay alleging a constitutional defect in the
military decision.73 At the court-martial, the defense had moved under
the Jencks Act7 4 for discovery of a tape recording made during interrogation of the key government witness. The tape, however, could not
be found. The court of claims rendered judgment for the defendant
on the ground that the trial court had failed to require that the government prove that the destruction was done in good faith.7 5 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the government adequately explained the loss of the evidence, the denial of discovery was
76
not a violation of due process.

The Court in Augenblick looked not to the possible usefulness of
the missing tapes to the defense 7 but to the conduct of the government agents and the procedures followed in handling the tapes.78 The
the suppression-of-evidence approach, but rather on "the accused's right to a fair trial."
Id. at 879.
70 These courts do not necessarily cite the interim notes cases, but follow the general
approach of those cases, emphasizing the good faith of the agent and the circumstances
of the loss. These factors were wholly ignored in the suppression cases.
71 The court may be using.t.he good faith of the agent as the basis for its decision
when the materiality of the evidence is unclear. See text and note at note 51 supra; text at
notes 83-88 infra.
72 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
73 The Supreme Court assumed, for the purposes of argument, that such an attack may
be made. Id. at 351-52.
74 See note 2 supra.
75 Augenblick v. United States, 377 F.2d 586 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The court interpreted Killian as holding that good faith is the determinative aspect in applying sanctions in all
destruction situations. Id. at 598. It held that the burden of showing good faith is on the
government. Id.
76 393 U.. at 355-56.
77 The Supreme Court did not expressly refer to Killian in reaching its decision, but
followed the Killian approach, emphasizing the good faith of the agent and the procedures
followed. Id. at 355-56.
78 The court of claims had examined in detail the potential usefulness of the tapes for

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:542

Court noted that the government had introduced testimony on "the
Navy's routine in handling and using such recordings" and that "an
earnest effort was made to locate them." 79 The record of the case was
found to be "devoid of credible evidence that [the tapes] were suppressed," ' referring apparently to bad faith supression. Although the
Court expressly held that "the Government bore the burden of producing [the tapes] or explaining why it could not do so,"81 the government's explanation in this case was deemed to be adequate, even
though the whereabouts of the tapes remained a "mystery. "82
A similar emphasis on the good faith of the government agents is
seen in State v. Maloney.8 In Maloney, a first-degree murder case, the
defendant, a fifteen-year-old boy, claimed that the killing of his mother
and stepfather occurred after the stepfather had discovered the defendant in bed with his mother following sexual intercourse between the
mother and the defendant. The evidence sought by the defense was a
"used" condom, which the defense argued would, under scientific
examination, show that the defendant had in fact engaged in sexual
relations with his mother and, thereby, support his contention that
the killing was done in self-defense when his stepfather became enraged.84 The condom, however, had been thrown away by the investi-

gating officers who found the bodies.
The court in Maloney dismissed the potential usefulness of the condom to the defense as "mere speculation." 85 The court's primary
emphasis was placed on the good faith of the agents: 86
[The agents] could not then have known that defendant was to
later claim that his stepfather had discovered him and his mother
in an act of sexual intercourse. Nor could they have known ...
that such evidence might tend to exonerate the accused. Cer87
tainly the destruction thereof was not the result of guile.
In order for sanctions to be imposed, the agents "must know, or have
impeaching the key government witness, whose "veracity was obviously questioned by the
members of the court-martial." 377 F.2d at 605.
79 393 U.S. at 355.
80 Id. at 356.
81 Id. at 355--56.
82 Id. at 55.
83 105 Ariz. 348, 464 P.2d 793, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
84 According to the defendant, the mother was either accidentally or deliberately shot
by the father when she tried to stop the fight. Id. at 350.
85 Id. at 351.
86 The court did refer to the suppression cases, but nevertheless went on to stress the
good faith of the agents. Id.
87 Id.
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reason to know, that the evidence being destroyed was either material
88
or favorable to the accused."
Courts following the interim notes approach have not indicated
what sanctions will be applied should the loss of evidence be found
to be the result of a bad faith destruction. Presumably, the sanctions
would be similar to those imposed by courts following the suppression
approach. Where the evidence related to the testimony of a government
witness, as in Augenblick, that testimony should be excluded from the
trial. Where the evidence would have affirmatively supported the defense, as in Maloney, it might be necessary to dismiss the case. 9
C.

Critique of Application of Suppression and Interim Notes
Approaches

The problem with applying the reasoning of either the suppression
cases or the interim notes cases is that the loss or destruction of evidence is simply neither animal. Loss or destruction is not suppression,
which involves evidence still in existence, and the evidence is not
interim in nature.
The destruction situation has, to be sure, elements similar to each
of the two areas. As in the suppression case, the defendant in the
destruction situation has been forced, because of actions of a government agent, to go to trial without the benefit of evidence that he
contends would have been useful to his defense. The possible good
faith of the agent is largely irrelevant" to the defendant in both the
suppression and destruction contexts where he has been deprived of
material evidence. And, as in the interim notes case, the evidence
sought has been destroyed.
The destruction situation, however, differs significantly from both
the suppression and interim notes cases. In the suppression case, the
evidence, because it is still in existence, is easily analyzable. The court's
total concentration on the materiality of the evidence is sensible. In
the destruction situation, however, determining the usefulness of the
evidence for the defense becomes more tenuous due to its nonexistence. Unlike the interim notes case, there is no incorporation of the
evidence lost. Because of this absence of both incorporation and the assumption of harmless error that incorporation produces, the use of
s8 Id. at 352.
89 It may be possible, where the evidence would at most only substantiate the defen-

dant's general story, but would not directly prove him innocent, for the court to instruct
the jury that it must accept the story as true. See text and note at note 124 infra.
90 The agent's good faith would be relevant to the defendant only in the sense that if
the agent has destroyed the evidence in bad faith, there is a greater chance that the evidence would have been helpful to the defendant.
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good faith and adherence to normal procedures as determinative factors is less justifiable in the destruction situation. There is the added
danger that courts applying the interim notes approach to the destruction situation may, as they have in the interim notes cases, accept
without question the government agent's statement that he acted in
good faith and that the destruction was in accordance with normal
practices.
Neither the suppression cases nor the interim notes cases indicate
fully what sanctions are appropriate in the destruction situation. In
both the suppression and interim notes cases, a new trial provides an
adequate remedy for the defendant. In the suppression case, since the
evidence sought is still in existence, a new trial allows the accused an
opportunity to defend himself with access to all material evidence. 91
In the interim notes case, should the court find it necessary to reverse
the conviction, a new trial can be held with the testimony of the
witness in question excluded.9 2 Simply providing a new trial without
further instructions, however, will not provide an adequate remedy
where the evidence destroyed is part of the defendant's affirmative
defense. The accused will still be deprived of the evidence that he
sought at the prior trial.
D.

United States v. Bryant
United States v. Bryant93 presents another possible approach to the
problem of loss or destruction of evidence. In Bryant, the defendants
Bryant and Turner, together with Johnson (who did not appeal), had
been convicted of offenses involving the sale of heroin. The sale was
made to Pope, an undercover agent for the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs. Pope, the principal witness for the prosecution,
testified at the trial that he and Johnson made the general arrangements in Pope's motel room for the sale of the heroin to Pope. On the
following day, according to Pope, Johnson and Bryant visited Pope at
his motel room. After some negotiations, Bryant approved the sale of a
particular quantity of heroin at a particular price. Later the same day,
Johnson, accompanied by Turner, came to Pope's motel room. According to Pope, the three of them had a general conversation about
the narcotics business at this time. The three went to Johnson's home
to pick up the heroin and subsequently returned to Pope's motel room,
where payment was made. During the various conversations occurring
91 The court can apply this sanction liberally without fear of letting a guilty man go
free. See text at note 37 supra.
92

There is a greater chance in the interim notes case than in the suppression case,

however, that a reversal may lead to dismissal. See note 60 supra.
93 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), noted in 1971 DuKE L.J. 644.
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in Pope's room, other government agents were in the next room listening and making a tape recording of the transaction.
The defense sought to discover the tape recording. The prosecution
admitted that a tape had been made, but stated that it had been lost
at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. At the hearing on
the defense motion to discover the tape, the agent in charge of the
taping admitted that he had made no effort to preserve the tape or to
consult a superior regarding his decision not to preserve it.
The prosecution attempted to show at the trial that Bryant and
Turner aided and abetted in the sale of heroin by Johnson. Pope's
account of the motel room conversation and the roles allegedly played
by the defendants became the basis of the government's case.94
Judge Wright, speaking for the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, recognized the relevance of the lost tapes with
respect to the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence:
It is possible, after all, that the tapes might have revealed that
there was no discussion whatever of a narcotics deal while appellants were in the motel room or that they in no way participated
in the conversations. More probably, the tape might have clarified
the context in which certain remarks were made or corrected
other matters of emphasis and degree in Agent Pope's testimony.9 5
Yet the court did not, as in Trimble and Lee, impose sanctions on the
ground that the evidence was highly relevant and "might have completely undercut the Government's case."9 6 Rather, in determining
whether sanctions should be imposed, the court expressly followed
Augenblick and looked to the circumstances of the loss:
Augenblick not only makes clear that the circumstances of the
tape's disappearance in these cases should be relevant to the question of proper sanctions. It also suggests that, while sanctions
should be imposed in cases of bad faith suppression of evidence,
an exception will be made for good faith loss ....

An exception

for good faith loss of important evidence must not be allowed to
swallow the discovery rules, and the burden of explanation on the
Government must be a heavy one; but criminal convictions otherwise based on sufficient evidence may be permitted to stand so
long as the Government made "earnest efforts" to preserve crucial
97
materials and to find them once a discovery request is made.
94 The court in Bryant noted, id. at 645, that "[w]ithout Agent Pope's account of the
motel room conversations, the Government would have almost no evidence against appellant Bryant and a much weaker case against appellant Turner."
95 Id. at 645-46.
96 Id. at 648.
97 Id. at 651.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:542

Using this general framework, with its emphasis on governmental
conduct, the court fashioned two solutions to the destruction-of-evidence problem: one for future cases and one for the case then before
it.

For the future, the court directed the government agencies to promulgate and enforce rigorous and systematic rules regarding the preservation of all discoverable evidence. When the destruction situation
arises in the future, the court stated, it will (1) examine the rules themselves to determine whether they are adequate for preserving all discoverable evidence and (2) inquire into the conduct of the particular
agent to determine whether he has attempted in good faith to follow the
rules:
[W]e hold that sanctions for nondisclosure based on loss of evidence will be invoked in the future unless the Government can
show that it has promulgated, enforced and attempted in good
faith to follow rigorous and systematic procedures designed to
preserve all [court's emphasis] discoverable evidence gathered in
the course of a criminal investigation. The burden ...

is on the

Government to make this showing. Negligent failure
to comply
98
with the required procedures will provide no excuse.
The court emphasized that all discoverable evidence is, in the future,
to be preserved by the governmental agencies. Since "there is no exception [to the general rule] for good faith administrative decision that
certain evidence is not discoverable and thus need not be preserved,"
the court warned the government agencies that in framing their rules
for evidence preservation, they "must define discoverable evidence very
broadly, including any materials that 'might' be 'favorable' to the
accused." 99

Since no such rules had previously been required, the court followed
an approach similar to that used in the interim notes cases and Augenblick to deal with the particular case before it. Factors to be weighed
in determining whether to impose sanctions included not only the
importance of the evidence lost and the evidence of guilt adduced at
the trial but also the degree of negligence or bad faith involved. The
court remanded the case to the district court for further inquiry into
these areas. o0
In Bryant, the court did not make clear what sanctions it will apply
in the future where there is a loss or destruction of evidence. For the
case then before it, the court recognized that the only possible sanc98 Id. at 652.

99 Id. at 652 n.21.
100 Id. at 653.
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tion, should it be found necessary to apply one, would be a new trial
with the testimony of Pope excluded.' 0 ' The court noted, however,
that this would be tantamount to dismissing the case "since without
02
the testimony there would be no case."'
On remand, 0 3 the district court, after holding a hearing, found
that the lost tape had been played by the agents and discovered to be
wholly unintelligible. The district court affirmed the convictions and
the case was once again appealed.
In the second appeal of the case,' 0 4 the court of appeals further expanded its ruling with respect to future cases. The court repeated its
warning that all discoverable evidence must, in the future, be preserved and expressly stated that this included both intelligible and unintelligible tapes. 0 5 The court noted that "if the Bureau's rule had
allowed nonpreservation of tapes . . . judged by an agent to be un0
intelligible, it would have violated the principles we set forth ....
The court concluded that if the present case arose in the future, the
negligent conduct of the agent in failing to preserve the unintelligible
07
tape "would surely result in imposition of full sanctions."'
In the case then before it, the court held, however, that the convictions should stand. Under the "more pragmatic" approach used for the
present case, the court found that "the unintelligibility of the tapeswhen combined with the very strong evidence of guilt adduced at
trial-outweighs the negligence involved in the loss of the tape."' 0 8

E.

Critique of the Bryant Approach for Future Cases

The chief advantage of the Bryant approach for future cases lies in
its demand for rigorous and systematic rules for evidence preservation. 0 9 In this respect, it remedies the major drawback of the Killian
line of cases: the tendency of the courts to accept, with little, if any,
further inquiry, the government agent's statement that he acted in
good faith and in accord with normal practices. Under the B'ryant
approach, a court will compare the agent's action and the procedure
101 Id. This is the sanction provided in the Jencks Act. See note 2 supra.
102 Id.

331 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1971).
448 F.2d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971). It is interesting to note that the same panel of judges
(Wright, McGowen, and Johnson) decided both Bryant appeals.
103
104

105 Id. at 1184 n.1.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1184. The sanction would be a new trial with Pope's testimony excluded. This
would probably lead to dismissal since the prosecutor's case was based almost entirely on
Pope's testimony.

10 Id.

109 The court's demand in Bryant for systematic rule making by government agencies
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prescribed by the agency and decide for itself whether the agent's
conduct was actually in accord with normal practices. More important,
the Bryant approach allows the court to review the rules established
by the agency to determine if they effectively preserve evidence. As
Judge Wright stated, "regular procedures for preservation must be
adequate for the task; systematic non-preservation of tapes . . .might

be regular, but would be insufficiently protective of defendants' right
to discovery."' 1 0 The Bryant approach is an attempt to bring structure
and systematic rules to the pretrial period, which the court saw to
be "a dark no-man's land of unreviewed bureaucratic and discretionary
decision making.""'
There are, however, some serious problems with the Bryant approach for future cases. First, the court may be placing an almost
impossible burden on the government agencies. The impracticality
comes not in the demand for systematic and rigorous rules; this is
clearly a demand that should have been made long ago." 2 The impracticality arises, rather, from the court's repeated warning that all
discoverable evidence must be preserved. While this is a desirable
goal, it may be realistically impossible to effect due to the extremely
broad range of discoverable evidence. 113 When a government agent
comes to the scene of a crime, he cannot know which objects present
might be material or useful to the defense." 4 The Bryant rule would
appear to demand that everything at the crime scene be preserved.
A second disadvantage of the Bryant approach arises from the fact
that the imposition of sanctions will depend largely on the conduct
of the government agent and not on presence of prejudicial error to
the defendant." 5 In its second opinion, the Bryant court specifically
stated that if the same case arose in the future, the court would, because
of the agent's negligence, impose sanctions even though there was
strong evidence of guilt adduced at the trial and the nondisclosed tape,
being unintelligible, probably would have been of little value to the
defense. This approach can perhaps be justified on the ground that
without the threat of sanctions, the government agencies would not
has been expressly approved in K.C. DAvis, ADMINISrRAvIE LAW TEXT 50, 151 (3d ed.

1972).

11o

439 F.2d at 652.

'"I Id. at 644.

112 See K.C. DAvis, DIsCRErIONARY Jussmc 84-96 (1969).
113 See note 2 supra.
114 A number of courts have held that the prosecution may not decide for the defense
what is material. See text and note at note 34 supra.
115 For a discussion of the emphasis placed in the suppression cases on prejudicial
error, see text and notes at notes 19-22 supra.

1972]

Loss or Destruction of Evidence

rigorously enforce and follow the rules of evidence preservation."16
The opposite side of the coin, however, is much less easy to justify. No
sanctions will be imposed where the agency has adhered to all requisite rules of evidence preservation even though the evidence lost or
destroyed, according to the defendant, would have been exculpatory.
In looking only at the circumstances of the loss or destruction, the
court ignored the one factor crucial to the defendant: the usefulness
of this particular evidence to this particular defendant. Where evidence important to the defense of the accused is lost or destroyed,
the harm to the defendant is the same regardless of the good faith of
the government agent. 17
Finally, the court in Bryant failed to indicate what range of sanctions trial courts could apply in the future. The court recognized that
an infraction of the Jencks Act"18 would result in the striking of the
testimony of the witness whose prior statement has been lost. It offered
no indication, however, of what sanction is proper where evidence
pertaining to an affirmative defense has been lost or destroyed by
government agents.
F. A Proposed Alternative
Logically, the test for determining when to impose sanctions for
the loss or destruction of evidence should turn on the materiality of
the evidence to the defense." 9 As long as the defendant can show some
particular harm 20 resulting from the deprivation of the evidence,
some sanction should be imposed to correct the harm to the defendant.
As the courts in the suppression cases' 21 have long recognized, the good
faith of the government agent is largely irrelevant where the evidence is
material to the accused. The only situation in which the motives of
the agent should be considered is where the defense shows that the
agent acted in bad faith. 22 The court may, upon such a showing, pre116 See note 14 supra.
117 For a discussion of the possible relevance to the defense of the agent's good faith,
see note 90 supra.
118 See note 2 supra.
119 Since the evidence in question no longer exists, an analysis of its materiality will
admittedly not always be easy.
120 When the defendant can show neither a particular harm nor bad faith on the part
of the government agent, no sanction will be applied.

121 See text and note at notes 14-18 supra.
122 Bad faith on the part of the government agent is relevant in the application of
sanctions in that it gives rise to a suggestion that the evidence destroyed would have been

material to the defense. Presumably, an agent acting in bad faith will destroy those pieces
of evidence that he regards as helpful to the defense. No such presumption of materiality
arises, however, if the destruction was the result of negligence.
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sume the materiality of the evidence and place the burden of proving
123
nonmateriality on the prosecution.
The range of sanctions available to the trial court should be broad 124
since the type of evidence and the degree of materiality can vary
greatly in destruction situations. In some cases, the prior existence of
the object but not the object itself may be important to the defense. 125
Here, the government agent's statement in court that such an object
was found at the scene will be sufficient to insure an adequate defense. 26 Where the evidence would have been part of an affirmative
defense and the defense makes some, albeit not a particularly strong,
showing of specific materiality, the court may wish to use a missingevidence instruction. The jury would be instructed that it may,
but need not, presume that the evidence would have shown what
the defense claimed it would. 1 27 In another type of case, the defense
may make a strong showing of materiality of the evidence for supporting the accused's general version of the occurrence, although not for
proving his innocence directly. Here, the court may wish to instruct
the jury that that particular aspect of the defense's case must be taken
as established fact. Where the defense makes a strong showing that
the evidence would directly establish his innocence, the court may
find it necessary to dismiss the case entirely.1 28 If the evidence is
relevant only for impeaching a government witness, then upon a
showing of particular harm by the defense, 129 the court may strike
the witness's testimony.130 The court may demand a greater showing
of harm in this last situation than where the evidence is relevant to
the affirmative defense since the witness himself is still available to the
defense.
123 The possibility of the defense showing bad faith on the part of the agent without
showing the materiality of the evidence are slight since the chief evidence of bad faith
would be, in most cases, the materiality of the evidence.
124 The courts may find guidance in the sanctions provided in the civil rules for noncompliance with discovery orders. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) provides:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action.... (B) An
order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims
or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceeding
until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof,
or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party ....
125 E.g., State v. Dabney, 181 Neb. 263, 147 N.W.2d 768 (1967) (defendant testified that
deceased drew knife before the killing, and state's witness admitted at trial that knife was
found at scene).
126 Id. at 269, 147 N.W.2d at 772.
127 See generally 2 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE 162-88 (3d ed. 1940).
128 See text and note at note 69 supra.
129 See text and notes at notes 52-56 supra.
130 See note 2 supra.
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Where the defendant can describe specifically the evidence he is
seeking,131 but the government denies its prior existence, the court
should place the burden of showing its nonexistence on the government. 1 2 In this situation, the court may demand that the government
offer evidence that some type of evidence preservation rules were
being followed by the agency. Where the government is able to show
the prior nonexistence of the evidence, clearly no sanction is necessary.
Should the court find, however, that the evidence sought was in
existence, as the defense contended, the court should apply one of
the sanctions outlined above, depending on the degree of materiality
of the evidence to the defense.
At present, appellate courts have not yet indicated the scope of
sanctions open to trial courts. Offering a wide panoply of sanctions,
as suggested above, may have the advantage of steering trial courts
away from the extremes-no sanction or dismissal.
Under the proposed approach, the court's demand in Bryant for
rigorous and systematic rules for evidence preservation need not be
disregarded. Courts would be able to continue to apply sanctions
where the loss or destruction was the result of negligence or bad faith.
Under the proposed approach, however, these sanctions would be
separate from those applied at the trial and would not benefit the
defendant. Constructing such sanctions for disciplining the government agencies is beyond the scope of this comment. 33
Regardless of the approach a court takes, the problem of loss or
destruction of evidence is clearly a serious one. The various protections afforded the defendant at the trial will be of little benefit to
him if he has no remedy for the loss or destruction of a material part
of his defense by the government prior to the trial.
Jean Wegman Burns
131 Where the defense fails to specify the evidence that was allegedly lost or destroyed,
courts have refused to apply sanctions. E.g., Hill v. United States, 374 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 842 (1967).
132 Realistically, this would probably result in nothing more than a number of government agents testifying that the evidence sought was not at the scene of the crime.
133 See generally Comment, Actions Against Prosecutors Who Suppress or Falsify Evidence, 47 TcAs L. Rr-v. 642 (1969).

